X-Git-Url: http://git.madism.org/?p=apps%2Fmadmutt.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=crypt-gpgme.c;h=145a6e0f2d29c4602b68b1f8b93cacc549993200;hp=e920128ccd5b82212c23e6c76a32a5e4261c59de;hb=63694769caa96f36675293e45a01e91cbe3175b4;hpb=238b70e39b78f585c586bd51aef41988b3cc73d1 diff --git a/crypt-gpgme.c b/crypt-gpgme.c index e920128..145a6e0 100644 --- a/crypt-gpgme.c +++ b/crypt-gpgme.c @@ -24,13 +24,14 @@ #include #include +#include + #include "mutt.h" -#include "mutt_crypt.h" +#include #include "mutt_menu.h" #include "mutt_curses.h" #include "handler.h" #include "enter.h" -#include "mime.h" #include "copy.h" #include "pager.h" #include "recvattach.h" @@ -287,7 +288,7 @@ static int crypt_id_is_valid (crypt_key_t * key) /* Return a bit vector describing how well the addresses ADDR and U_ADDR match and whether KEY is valid. */ -static int crypt_id_matches_addr (ADDRESS * addr, ADDRESS * u_addr, +static int crypt_id_matches_addr (address_t * addr, address_t * u_addr, crypt_key_t * key) { int rv = 0; @@ -3232,7 +3233,7 @@ static LIST *crypt_add_string_to_hints (LIST * hints, const char *str) will be set to true on return if the user did override the the key's validity. */ static crypt_key_t *crypt_select_key (crypt_key_t * keys, - ADDRESS * p, const char *s, + address_t * p, const char *s, unsigned int app, int *forced_valid) { int keymax; @@ -3423,10 +3424,10 @@ static crypt_key_t *crypt_select_key (crypt_key_t * keys, return k; } -static crypt_key_t *crypt_getkeybyaddr (ADDRESS * a, short abilities, +static crypt_key_t *crypt_getkeybyaddr (address_t * a, short abilities, unsigned int app, int *forced_valid) { - ADDRESS *r, *p; + address_t *r, *p; LIST *hints = NULL; int weak = 0; @@ -3496,7 +3497,7 @@ static crypt_key_t *crypt_getkeybyaddr (ADDRESS * a, short abilities, || !(validity & CRYPT_KV_ADDR))) this_key_has_weak = 1; } - rfc822_free_address (&r); + address_delete (&r); if (match) { crypt_key_t *tmp; @@ -3575,7 +3576,7 @@ static crypt_key_t *crypt_getkeybystr (char *p, short abilities, || (option (OPTPGPLONGIDS) && !m_strncasecmp(p, "0x", 2) && !m_strcasecmp(p + 2, crypt_keyid (k) + 8)) - || str_isstr (k->uid, p)) { + || m_stristr(k->uid, p)) { crypt_key_t *tmp; debug_print (5, ("match.\n")); @@ -3635,7 +3636,7 @@ static crypt_key_t *crypt_ask_for_key (char *tag, if (whatfor) { if (l) - str_replace (&l->dflt, resp); + m_strreplace(&l->dflt, resp); else { l = p_new(struct crypt_cache, 1); l->next = id_defaults; @@ -3655,15 +3656,15 @@ static crypt_key_t *crypt_ask_for_key (char *tag, /* This routine attempts to find the keyids of the recipients of a message. It returns NULL if any of the keys can not be found. */ -static char *find_keys (ADDRESS * to, ADDRESS * cc, ADDRESS * bcc, +static char *find_keys (address_t * to, address_t * cc, address_t * bcc, unsigned int app) { char *keyID, *keylist = NULL, *t; size_t keylist_size = 0; size_t keylist_used = 0; - ADDRESS *tmp = NULL, *addr = NULL; - ADDRESS **last = &tmp; - ADDRESS *p, *q; + address_t *tmp = NULL, *addr = NULL; + address_t **last = &tmp; + address_t *p, *q; int i; crypt_key_t *k_info, *key; const char *fqdn = mutt_fqdn (1); @@ -3687,7 +3688,7 @@ static char *find_keys (ADDRESS * to, ADDRESS * cc, ADDRESS * bcc, abort (); } - *last = rfc822_cpy_adr (p); + *last = address_list_dup (p); while (*last) last = &((*last)->next); } @@ -3729,8 +3730,8 @@ static char *find_keys (ADDRESS * to, ADDRESS * cc, ADDRESS * bcc, } else if (r == -1) { p_delete(&keylist); - rfc822_free_address (&tmp); - rfc822_free_address (&addr); + address_delete (&tmp); + address_delete (&addr); return NULL; } } @@ -3748,8 +3749,8 @@ static char *find_keys (ADDRESS * to, ADDRESS * cc, ADDRESS * bcc, #endif &forced_valid)) == NULL) { p_delete(&keylist); - rfc822_free_address (&tmp); - rfc822_free_address (&addr); + address_delete (&tmp); + address_delete (&addr); return NULL; } } @@ -3774,18 +3775,18 @@ static char *find_keys (ADDRESS * to, ADDRESS * cc, ADDRESS * bcc, keylist_used = m_strlen(keylist); crypt_free_key (&key); - rfc822_free_address (&addr); + address_delete (&addr); } - rfc822_free_address (&tmp); + address_delete (&tmp); return (keylist); } -char *pgp_gpgme_findkeys (ADDRESS * to, ADDRESS * cc, ADDRESS * bcc) +char *pgp_gpgme_findkeys (address_t * to, address_t * cc, address_t * bcc) { return find_keys (to, cc, bcc, APPLICATION_PGP); } -char *smime_gpgme_findkeys (ADDRESS * to, ADDRESS * cc, ADDRESS * bcc) +char *smime_gpgme_findkeys (address_t * to, address_t * cc, address_t * bcc) { return find_keys (to, cc, bcc, APPLICATION_SMIME); } @@ -3853,7 +3854,7 @@ static int gpgme_send_menu (HEADER * msg, int *redraw, int is_smime) is_smime ? APPLICATION_SMIME : APPLICATION_PGP, NULL))) { snprintf (input_signas, sizeof (input_signas), "0x%s", crypt_keyid (p)); - str_replace (is_smime ? &SmimeDefaultKey : &PgpSignAs, + m_strreplace(is_smime ? &SmimeDefaultKey : &PgpSignAs, input_signas); crypt_free_key (&p); @@ -3906,7 +3907,7 @@ int smime_gpgme_send_menu (HEADER * msg, int *redraw) static int verify_sender (HEADER * h, gpgme_protocol_t protocol) { - ADDRESS *sender = NULL; + address_t *sender = NULL; unsigned int ret = 1; if (h->env->from) {